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Summary: This paper describes the major instruments of industrial policy in Morocco since 
its independence (1956) and assesses them empirically. Regarding the second objective, 
several methods for assessing the impact of industrial policy exist in the economic literature. 
In this paper the question is raised whether government selective policies have contributed to 
economic growth of private firms in Morocco. To answer this question empirically, the paper 
analyzes the factors affecting the growth process of Moroccan private firms, including 
selective government policies. The analysis is based on a field survey of 850 firms carried out 
under the auspices of the World Bank in 2004. The sample includes firms of different sizes 
and covers all major manufacturing industries. A major result of this case study is that they 
are indirect clues of the inefficacy of industrial policies in Morocco, at least measured by their 
impact on firm growth.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Until recently, two extreme views seem often to have dominated the discussions of the role of 
the government in economic development. The first view has been that effective government 
was not only necessary due to market failure but possibly even sufficient to achieve economic 
development. At least implicit in this view is the argument that if a particular political regime  
could not be counted on to perform completely and honestly in this process, either the regime 
would be forced to do so as a result of building political pressures or else it would lose power, 
through elections if available or through other means if not. 
 
The second view, associated with the neoclassical counterrevolution or new orthodoxy school, 
which has its roots in Frederick Hayek, was developed in the ideas of James Buchanan and 
was applied to development policy by Anne Krueger, Depaak Lal and others. In this view, 
participants in government, such as politicians and bureaucrats, were selfish and self-
interested as owners of firms and other assets but lacked the competitive climate of markets to 
restrain them. Even when the economy was locked in a poverty trap, government itself played 
a role in that bad equilibrium. While these points might enjoy a broad agreement under some 
circumstances, this approach drew the strong conclusion that, as a rule, at least beyond a 
minimum rule, governments could only make things worse.1 
 
These two extreme views became clearer when one looks at the particular field of industrial 
policy in developing countries. For the second view industrial policy elicits very strong 
reactions, while the first view sees it somehow as the magic bullet for resolving urgent 
problems of economic growth. The term industrial policy means different things to different 
people. For us, following the definition of Pack and Saggi (2005), “industrial policy is 
basically any type of selective intervention or government policy that attempts to alter the 
sectoral structure of production toward sectors that are expected to offer better prospects for 
economic growth than would occur in the absence of such intervention, i.e. in the market 
equilibrium.”2  
 
                                                           
1 Krueger, A. (1990), Deepack Lal (1995), Hayek, von (1994)  
2 Pack and Saggi (2003: 2) 
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Given this definition, we can further illustrate the two positions regarding the role of the state 
in economic development. Those who believe strongly in the efficient working of markets 
(second view) see any argument in favor of industrial policy as fiction or, worse, an invitation 
for all types of rent seeking activities. On the other side, people who believe market failures 
are pervasive in developing countries think that any path to economic development requires a 
liberal dose of industrial policy (first view). 
 
In order to shed more light, or even settle the debate in favor of one view, several authors 
have either reviewed the analytical literature (see for instance, Pack & Saggi, 2005, Rodrick 
2004) or the empirical evidence (see, Noland & Pack 2003) or both. The results of these 
literature surveys are not conclusive: “While there certainly exist cases where government 
intervention co-exists with success, in many instances industrial policy has failed to yield any 
gains. Above all, the real issue is that the relevant counterfactuals are not available. Consider 
the argument that Japan’s industrial policy was crucial for its success. Since we do not know 
how Japan would have fared under Laisser-faire, it is difficult to attribute its success to its 
industrial policy. Maybe it would have done still better in the absence of industrial policy or 
maybe it would have done much worse.“ (Pack & Saggi, 2005: 3). Given this basic difficulty, 
we can only hope to obtain indirect clues regarding the efficacy of industrial policy. 
 
In this paper, I intend to add more empirical evidence to the debate on industrial policy in 
developing countries. While looking at the case study of Morocco, I hope to deliver additional 
indirect clues regarding the efficacy of this policy. The paper is organized as follows. In 
section 2 I describe important aspects of industrial policy in Morocco since its independence. 
Then, in section 3, I try to assess this policy. At the center of this section is the question 
whether industrial policy has contributed to economic growth of the private sector in 
Morocco. In section 4 I summarize the paper and provide some concluding remarks.        
     
2. Industrial policy in Morocco 
 
Since its independence in 1956, the Moroccan State has practiced selective interventions in 
favor of specific private entrepreneurs, firms, whole industries and regions.  For this purpose 
it has been using all kinds of policy instruments, ranging from strong interventionist policies 
in the 70s to more liberal ones in the 80s and 90s.   Based on the criteria related to the 
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intensity of State intervention in the economy, I will divide the history of the Moroccan 
industrial policy into two periods: (a) 1960-1982 and (b) 1983-2005. 
 
2.1. Activist Industrial Policy (1960-82) 
 
After its independence and the subsequent transition period between 1956 and 1960/62, the 
Moroccan State has developed different activist policies aimed at restructuring the economy 
through the process of picking winners and losers among firms, industries and regions.  These 
policies include (a) incentive programs for investments in the industrial sector, (b) subsidized 
loans for investors in other selected sectors, c) public procurement policy in favor of certain 
firms in specific industries, (d) transfer of foreign ownership to Moroccans (known as 
“Politique de Marocanisation”), (e) creation of state-owned enterprises etc.  
 
The main purpose of the first set of policies was to promote an import-substitution industrial 
strategy through means such as according investment privileges and custom protection for 
industrial goods and services. The investment privileges were codified in Investment Codes3, 
whose main thrust was to change the relative prices in the economy in favor of nationally-
manufactured industrial goods.  To the same direction pointed the newly introduced Customs 
Code which imposed heavy tariffs on certain imported industrial goods, quantitative 
limitations or even import prohibition on others. 
 
In addition, the Moroccan State has pursued its policies of picking winners and losers through 
its credit policy. Since most financial institutions at that time were in state ownership and run 
by bureaucrats, subsidized credits and loans were attributed to investors in the national 
manufacturing sector and other selected sectors of the economy, such as tourism, hotels, 
housing and agriculture. The benefits to private investors in those industries consisted of (i) 
allowing relatively long credit repayment periods, (ii) financing between 60 and 70 percent of 
investment through governmental credits and (iii) of agreeing to a system of fixed interest 
rates in a period of high inflation rates. In other words, the real costs of capital had been held 
superficially lower than market levels. 
 
A further means of protecting specific firms in specific industries is the channel by which 
firms get access to public procurements. During the period under consideration the Moroccan 
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State favored national enterprises in selected industries such as construction & public works, 
metallic and semi- metallic furniture industries etc. Only those firms had really access to 
contracts offered by the State; they were able to grow and prosper under its protection.  
 
A better known government policy of picking winners and losers is the policy of 
“moroccanization”, codified in the law (“Dahir”) of  March 2, 1973.  According to this law 
two lists of economic activities were established by the State. On the first list the following 
activities were included: trade activities (ranging from import to retail activities), all activities 
in construction and public works, automobile industry, leasing and advertising activities, 
credit institutions, warehouses, facility management (especially, management of real estate), 
food industry, fertilizers industry. The formal ownership of all businesses involved in these 
activities had to be transferred to Moroccan hands (“moroccanized”) before the end of 1974! 
The second list encompassed activities that had to be “moroccanized” before May 1975. It 
included businesses in the banking and insurance sectors, flour-milling industry, foodstuffs 
(pastes), cork, assembling of vehicles, electric and electronic materials etc.  
 
This vast operation of ownership transfer from foreigners to nationals is unique in the recent 
economic history of Morocco. It is a policy of capital substitution -substitution of foreign 
capital by national capital- that has created over night a new segment of Moroccan business 
firms in very important industries. Those industries include not only the ones mentioned 
above, but also - via  contagion and inter-linkage effects - other sectors like agriculture4 und 
manufacturing industries (for more details, see, Saadi 1989: 64).  
 
In addition to moroccanizing already existing foreign firms and assets, Moroccan State started 
in the 1960s, either alone or in partnership with foreign capital, to create completely new 
firms in several sectors of the economy. In the chemical industry “Maroc-Chemie”, in the 
motor vehicle industry “Berliet-Maroc” and “SOMACA” were set up. This policy continued 
in the 1970s.  A few examples from this period are: 
• SIMEF (Société des Industries Méchaniques et Électriques de Fés), created in 1973, 
with a start capital of 27 Mio. MAD 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
3 The Moroccan State had introduced four codes of industrial investments between 1958 and 1982. For a detailed 
description of those Codes, see Berrada (1986: 253- )  
4  Around 500 000 hectares of agricultural land and other assets were sold by foreign owners, mostly French, to 
Moroccans. 
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• SNEP (Société Nationale d’Electrolyse et de Pétrochimie), created in 1973, with a 
start capital of 160 Mio. MAD. 
• CIOR (Cimenterie de l’Oriental), created in 1976, with a start capital of 245 Mio. 
MAD. 
 
Dozens of similar State-owned enterprises had been created in the 1960 and 1970s. Some of 
them will be, however, later in the context of structural adjustment policies privatized.  In 
deed, deteriorating budget deficits and other severe macroeconomic imbalances, including the 
lack of economic growth, prompted Morocco to embark in the 1980s on program of 
macroeconomic stabilization and structural reform, as shortly described in the next section.    
  
2.2.   More liberal Industrial Policy (1983-2005)  
 
Early 1980s (exactly: 1983), Morocco started a program of structural adjustment policies, 
designed under the auspices of IMF and World Bank. The purpose of those ambitious 
macroeconomic reform programs was to promote an open, market- and export-oriented 
system, in order to stabilize the economy (more stable currency, lower inflation, lower budget 
deficits, lower balance of payment deficits etc.) and achieve higher growth rates. The means 
for achieving these goals were macroeconomic stabilization programs, liberalization of trade 
and selected domestic markets and privatization of public companies. 
  
With respect to macroeconomic stabilization, Morocco has in deed achieved very low 
inflation rates (below 2%), relatively low budget deficit (ranging from 11.6% in the 1980s to 
3.8% in 2003), a significant surplus in the balance of payment (due mainly to tourism and 
transfers of Moroccans residing abroad). Trade reforms have also been launched. The 
application of rates resulting from tariffication in 1996 put an end to the imposition of 
quantitative import restrictions on the majority of products. The continued computerization of 
customs procedures, the development of customs clearance warehouses and areas and the 
creation of domiciliation offices are on-site customs clearance procedures have substantially 
reduced the time taken for customs clearance and enhanced transparency in this area. 
 
Customs duties have been lowered on certain non-agricultural products. In 2000, the fiscal 
import levy was incorporated into the customs tariffs with the aim of simplifying imposition 
at the border. Morocco has bound all its tariffs lines solely at ad valorem rates ranging from 
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zero to 380 percent; duties on non-agricultural products have been bound at 40 per cent. In 
2004, the simple arithmetic average of the bound rates should be 42 percent. Other duties and 
taxes have been bound at 7.5 or 15 per cent. Morocco has also bound  market access for 
certain agricultural products by introducing tariff quotas which, in practice, are not applied, 
all imports of the products concerned being subject to the out-of-quota rates. 
 
Subsidies have been abolished for the majority of products, with the exception of locally-
produced sunflowers and sugar not intended for industrial use. A number of fiscal, customs 
and financial benefits are given to investors, especially exporting firms, thorough 1995 
Investment Charter, customs regimes, the free export zone regime and the Hassan II Fund for 
Economic and Social Development created in 2002. Subsidies are also granted for the 
promotion of exports of certain agricultural products by air freight. However, levies are 
applied to exports of maize, plant fiber and crude phosphates. 
 
In the automobile assembly industry, 60 to 70 per cent of locally-made components are 
required in exchange for certain advantages. Compulsory reserves of petroleum products and 
pharmaceuticals must be kept.  
 
Privatization of State-owned companies has also made progress. Started in 1993, the 
privatization program has until 2003 covered 66 (out of 113 planned) entities and thus 
generated revenues for the State of 55 Billions MAD  Price controls and marketing 
monopolies have also been abolished for almost all goods and services, with the exception of 
certain transport (rail transport, port and airport services etc.) and crude phosphates. The 
legislation on government procurement and competition policy entered into force in 1999 and 
2001 respectively. The Government Procurement Code enhances transparency and 
incorporates provisions to combat corruption; a price preference of up to 15 per cent is given 
to Moroccan firms for contracts for works and related design. 
 
In addition to these more general policies, the Moroccan State has pursued industrial policies 
that are targeted at specific sectors, ranging from agriculture, manufacturing to services. For 
illustration, a few examples will be mentioned here. The first example is the tourism industry. 
Being the second most important source of foreign currency after transfers from Moroccan 
residing abroad, this sector has been a major preoccupation of the Moroccan State in the last 
decades. A private-public partnership program called “Plan AZUR” has been set up, with the 
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aim of achieving 10 Millions tourists by the year 2010. To achieve this goal, additional 80 
000 hotel rooms should be built, 72 000 professionals trained, air transport upgraded and new 
organizations for marketing, environment etc. set up. Morocco should have by then around 
230 000 beds. For financing these different actions, both private and public money have been 
mobilized. The goal is to invest up to the year 2010 around 47 Billions MAD by the two 
sides.  
 
Another industry benefiting from government policies is the textile and clothing industry, the 
country’s largest export industry and biggest employer. This industry that for many years had 
taken advantage of preferential treatment from Europe is now facing tremendous competitive 
pressures from China and other internationals suppliers. In order to alleviate the resulting 
problems, the State has designed in collaboration with representatives of the profession a set 
of industry-specific policies, ranging from import tariff reductions to export and other 
subsidies.  
 
In addition to sectoral policies, Morocco has introduced other instruments of industrial policy. 
There are targeted at establishing new firms (through the “Centres Régionaux de 
l’Investissement”),  at promoting small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and at upgrading 
(“mise à niveau”) the managerial, technological and organizational infrastructure of private 
firms in specific industries through “l’Agence Nationale de la Petite et Moyenne Entreprise”. 
These programs have partly been financed by the European Union and other international 
donors.  
 
Initiated in 1977, the Mise à Niveau Program of manufacturing firms aims to modernize the 
industrial environment, strengthen support systems and promote competition among and 
competitiveness of industrial firms. Unfortunately, program outcomes so far have been below 
expectations. A recent study by the French Development Agency (AFD, 2005) recognized 
that until 2005, the amount of resources disbursed (14 millions Euro) and number of firms 
(85) benefited were very small for Morocco. The same report identifies the key factors 
explaining such results: (a) insufficient involvement and ownership by the Moroccan State; 
(b) long delays in the creation of  the counterpart financing mechanisms and multiple 
restrictions on their use; (c) insufficient financial stimulus offered as incentive for financial 
transparency by firms; and (d) institutional rigidities and poor management of the program.  
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 The latest series of industrial policies the Moroccan government has adopted is the so-called 
“Emergence” Program. Announced in November 2005 (see, www.leconomiste.ma), the 
program has essentially three goals: (a) attracting new investment opportunities into Morocco; 
(b) developing emerging sectors into more sophisticated and competitive products; and (c) 
reorienting key manufacturing export toward markets that have potential for expansions. The 
first measures that “Emergence” has taken consist of (a) financing facilities (improved access 
to the Mise a Niveau Fund, see above); (b) creation of a Guarantee Fund that supports 
restructuring existing guarantees on hold by commercial banks; and (c) technical assistance to 
enterprises whose guarantees are being restructured.  
 
“Emergence” proposes an export-led industrial strategy based on two pillars: (1) an active 
targeting of seven growth engines or “Poles de Competitivité” that should constitute the future 
Moroccan world class jobs, in a process known as “picking winners” and “choosing your 
battles”, and (2) the competitive modernization of the existing network (mise à niveau). 
According to information provided on the website of the Moroccan Prime Minister, 
“Emergence” should by 2013 generate an additional contribution to GDP of 91 Billions MAD 
and create directly around 240 000 new jobs.         
 
After this short review of some of the main instruments of the Moroccan industrial policies 
since Morocco’s independence, I now ask the question of how these policies can be assessed.              
       
3.  Assessment of Industrial Policy in Morocco 
 
Economists use two different approaches for assessing government policies. The first 
approach is called “normative” and is associated with welfare economics. An initial value 
judgment is made about optimal economic conditions, usually that the economy must be 
designed to maximize the satisfaction of consumers and producers. To achieve the optimum 
requires that marginal social costs must equal marginal social benefits in all markets. The free 
market economy does not automatically fulfill these conditions because (i) firms may be able 
to exploit monopoly; (ii) externalities of consumption and production exist; (iii) there are 
difficulties in supplying goods and services with the characteristics of “publicness”, and (iv) 
consumers may not chose the amount and composition of goods and services which “are in 
their best interests”. The government “should” therefore intervene in the free enterprise 
economy in order to rectify these “market failures” using such instruments as anti-monopoly 
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legislation, taxes to eliminate negative externalities and subsidies to promote positive 
externalities, public production of goods which the market cannot provide and regulations to 
prohibit sale of “harmful” products. There is considerable controversy about whether these 
optimal conditions properly reflect consumer and producer interests, particularly in a world of 
uncertainty about trends in costs and prices and changing consumer tastes and preferences. 
Nor can it be assumed that government policies can be precisely designed to remove the 
perceived failures of the market.  
 
The second approach is called “positive” and requires the identification of the policy 
objectives of government which are actually operative. This is, however, more difficult than it 
sounds. Governments in different countries may promote different objectives or at least assign 
them different orders of priority, and likewise successive governments in the same country 
may support different policy objectives. Government may not wish to reveal their policy 
objectives and their implications for the choice of policy instruments, at least in detail, for this 
may adversely affect political support – no policy is “costless” in the sense that it will satisfy 
all voters and interest groups all of the time. What can safely be said is that governments are 
concerned with a wider range of objectives affecting industries than indicated by welfare 
economics with its emphasis on the allocation of resources at a point in time.  At a minimum 
they are concerned with the growth of industrial output. They are concerned, rightly or 
wrongly, with the distribution of industry among regions etc.  
 
For indirectly assessing Moroccan industrial policies I will use a positive approach and ask 
whether industrial policies have affected, positively or negatively, the economic performance 
of private firms in Morocco. Economic performance can be measured by different indicators. 
The most popular ones are: measures of total factor productivity (TFP) in general and of labor 
productivity in particular; measures of profitability, measures of economic growth etc. For data 
availability reasons, I will be using measures of firm growth as indicators for the economic 
performance of Moroccan firms.   
 
Aggregate economic growth is commonly decomposed into two components: 
growth due to factor accumulation and growth due to an increase in total factor 
productivity. At the microeconomic level each of these components requires a 
further distinction. Aggregate factor accumulation can occur through the entry of 
new agents (such as firms, farms, banks, and households) or through the 
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expansion of existing ones. Aggregate total factor productivity can rise because 
the most productive agents expand their activities at the expense of the less 
productive, or because some agents innovate and their innovations are adopted by 
other agents. From the perspective of firms there are thus four sources of growth:  
 
¾ Organic growth (through investment) of existing firms 
¾ Successful formation of new firms operating in existing activities 
¾ Growth through concentration of firms’ activities (for instance through mergers and 
acquisitions), and 
¾ Growth through innovation and diffusion of new products and processes. 
 
This paper examines the growth experience in Morocco from the perspective of private firms. 
Concentrating primarily on the first microeconomic source of growth, it attempts to identify 
those factors influencing the growth process of private firms in Morocco either positively or 
negatively. Among those determinants of growth, selective government policies are specially 
highlighted. This should contribute to an empirical understanding of how selective 
governmental policies affect the growth performance of private firms in Morocco.  
 
This part of the paper is organized in three sub-sections. The first reviews the 
theoretical and the empirical literature that examines the major factors influencing 
the growth process of private firms, including policy variables. The second 
develops an empirical framework for both systematically organizing our thoughts 
about the major factors influencing the growth process and estimating the 
quantitative contribution of each. The third sub-section summarizes the 
econometric results, based on data from Morocco. 
 
3.1. Theoretical Background 
 
The enormous literature on the theory of the growth of firms is summarized both 
in standard textbooks (such as Scherer and Ross, 1990) and in extensive surveys 
such as You (1995), Trau (1996), Sutton (1997), Geroski (1999), and Hart (2000). 
There are also a large number of empirical studies of how firms grow.1 For several 
reasons, mainly related to data availability, I will concentrate on models of 
optimal firm size as the theoretical framework.2  
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Models of optimal firm size postulate that profit-maximizing firms can achieve an 
optimal size if they behave rationally. That size depends on the market structure in 
which the firm operates, that is, whether the setting is one of perfect competition 
or one of imperfect competition (monopoly, oligopoly, or monopolistic 
competition). 
 
In perfectly competitive markets, firms with a U-shaped average cost curve will 
grow until they reach the size corresponding to the lowest point on the curve; 
there is no incentive for them to grow beyond this size. Thus the sizes of perfectly 
competitive firms will be very narrowly dispersed, with any variation attributable 
to disequilibrium or managerial error, and this dispersion will diminish over time 
as firms converge toward the equilibrium size. One major conclusion of this 
theory is that small firms grow faster than larger ones until they reach what is 
called minimum efficient scale (MES) of production. 
 
If firms have market power (that is, there is imperfect competition), their optimal 
size may differ from this optimal cost position. In this situation the limit on a 
firm’s growth is determined by the demand for its unique product rather than by 
cost considerations. The typical firm faces a downward-sloping demand curve for 
its products. In practice, this constraint does not limit the growth of a firm because 
it can always introduce another product line. Product diversification is therefore 
another determinant of firm growth. 
 
Relaxing the assumptions of this neoclassical theory of the firm permits many 
other explanations of firms’ growth. The two that this paper considers are 
economies of scale and goals other than profit maximization. Economists 
distinguish among four different kinds of economies of scale: technical, 
pecuniary, external, and dynamic. All of these affect the growth process of firms 
and its determinants.  
 
The theory discussed so far assumes that all firms aim to maximize profits. Other 
assumptions about the goals of firms have different implications for firms’ 
growth. For example, Florance Sargant (1943) suggested that many owner-
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managed companies adopt “satisficing” rather than maximizing policies;3 instead 
of maximizing profits or sales, these firms opt for a quiet life and hence tend to 
employ fewer people than they could. Satisficing theories were subsequently 
developed by Simon (1959) and Cyert and March (1963). Baumol (1959) 
postulated that firms maximize sales subject to the constraint that profits satisfy 
their shareholders and the company’s plowback policy. A firm’s goals might also 
change over its life cycle, in response to conflict between its principals and their 
agents (Mueller, 1972). Young, dynamic firms have rapid growth and high 
profitability, and managers and shareholders are happy. But as a company matures 
and its investment opportunities decline, a conflict arises: managers may attempt 
to maximize growth at the expense of profitability.  
 
In summary, there exist several theoretical hypotheses about the determinants of 
optimal firm size and firm growth. Some of these hypotheses have been tested 
empirically, as shown in the next section.  
 
 
3.2. Empirical Framework  
 
Several economists have tried to translate the numerous theories of optimal firm 
size presented above into a simple, empirically testable model (see Geroski 1999 
and Geroski/Gugler 2001). The model can be stated as follows:  
 
∆Si(t) = Si* + βSi(t - 1) +µi(t),     (1) 
       
 
where Si(t) is the actual size of firm i at time t, Si* is the long-run steady-state size 
of firm i, β is the speed with which firm i converges toward Si* when Si ≠ Si*, and 
µi(t) is a normally distributed iid. white noise error process. 
 
Before equation (1) can be used for empirical work, one has to specify S*. The 
most common approach is to write 
 
Si*(t) = c + αX(t) + ηi(t),        (2)  
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where ηi(t) is a white noise error process and X(t) is a set of observable 
exogenous drivers of S*(t). Substituting equation (2) into equation (1),  
     
 
∆Si(t) = c + αX(t) + βSi(t - 1) + νi(t),    (3) 
 
where νi(t) ≡ µi(t) + ηi(t).  
 
If α = 0, equation (2) says that S* is constant over time and the same for all firms 
(up to a stochastic term). If α ≠ 0, S* also depends on a set of exogenous variables 
X(t). Based on our theoretical discussion and on other sources in the literature 
(cited below), these observable exogenous variables might include, in addition to 
size, the age of the firm, its legal form, its location, whether it engages in 
innovative activity, the diversification of its product line, its internal organization, 
the size of its market, the structure of its market, factors specific to its industry, 
state regulations and policies, our major emphasis, and others.4   
 
The major problem with using equation (2) or equation (3) is omitted variables. 
Most studies, including this one, cannot accurately correct for all of the possible 
determinants of Si*, and, as a consequence, it is often difficult to avoid the 
suspicion that α is estimated with bias. Despite this limitation I discuss below 
some of the determinants of firm size just mentioned. 
 
Age. Recent empirical studies suggest a negative correlation between firm age and 
firm growth. Decreasing returns to learning over time are one major reason. The 
probability diminishes that an aging firm will achieve additional efficiency gains 
(Jovanovic, 1982; Ericson and Pakes, 1995; Das, 1995; Farinas and Moreno, 
2000). This negative association has also been confirmed for German firms (see 
Harhoff and others, 1998; Steil and Wolf, 1999). 
 
Legal form. Theoretically, firms legally constituted in such a way that the owners 
enjoy limited liability have a greater incentive to pursue risky projects and 
therefore expect higher profits and growth rates than other firms (Stiglitz and 
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Weiss, 1981). This hypothesis has been tested empirically, for instance in 
Germany by Harhoff and others (1998), and has not been rejected. Those authors 
argue that the legal liability of a firm, which is determined by the legal form 
chosen for it, influences its growth rate. They also show that firms with limited 
liability have above-average growth rates.   
    
Location. Several researchers suggest that agglomeration effects (in the form of 
both regional concentration of a specific industry and regional concentration of 
several unrelated economic activities) can produce net positive externalities up to 
a threshold. Once this threshold is achieved, however, negative net externalities 
can be expected: high traffic, high land prices, environmental problems, and 
others. Geography matters, but its impact on firm growth cannot be determined ex 
ante.5     
 
Innovative activity. Technical innovations can be divided into product and 
process innovations. The introduction of product innovations normally results in 
a new demand, and that of process innovations in a reduction of costs. Both 
elements affect the growth process of the innovating firm positively (for a survey 
of the literature see Cohen, 1995). 
  
Diversification. As already mentioned, diversification also affects the growth 
process positively. It helps firms to cope with demand constraints on a specific 
product line and creates new opportunities for growth. 
 
Internal organization. In her classic study on firm growth, Penrose (1959) 
advanced the famous “managerial limits to growth” hypothesis. This argument 
starts from the premise that management is a team effort, in which individuals 
deploy specialized, functional skills as well as highly team-specific skills that 
enable them to coordinate their many activities in a coherent manner. As a firm 
expands, it needs to recruit new managers and must divert at least some existing 
managers from their current operational responsibilities to help manage the 
expansion of the management team. This places a constraint on the firm’s growth 
process.  
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Market size. Numerous empirical studies have confirmed the importance of 
market demand for a firm’s innovative activities and growth (see Cohen, 1995; 
Kleinknecht, 1996). It is assumed here that there is a positive correlation between 
market size and firm growth. 
 
Market structure. As discussed above, market structure is a major force behind a 
firm’s growth. The growth process of firms in competitive markets is driven by 
different forces than those that drive the process in firms under imperfect 
competition. 
 
Industry-specific environment. The variability of firm growth rates may also 
differ from industry to industry, depending upon the nature of the product, the 
character of competition, and so on. Dunne and others (1989a, 1989b) show that 
firms' growth rates vary significantly among the different industries in the 
manufacturing sector in the United States. Harhoff and others (1998) confirm 
sectoral differences in growth rates in Germany. Their study also shows that 
firms in the services sector in particular are characterized by above-average 
employment growth. Brüderl and others (1998) confirm significant sectoral 
differences in employment growth rates. Johnson and others (1997) find a close 
relation between growth dynamics within a sector and firms' growth rates. They 
argue that growth rates of firms in growing sectors should be higher than those of 
firms in stagnating or declining sectors. Young and growing markets are, as a 
rule, characterized by low barriers to entry, and thus by high rates of entry and 
exit. Individual firms therefore have different growth potentials as determined by 
their sector's life cycle. 
 
State regulations and policies. As the framer of the legal environment within 
which firms operate, and as the largest single domestic customer for goods and 
services, government affects the ability of firms to grow in a sustainable manner.  
A number of studies using different methodologies exist which attempt to 
evaluate the industrial policies pursued by various countries, especially East 
Asian countries -such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Noland and Pack 
(2003) have critically surveyed this literature and concluded “that evidence 
supporting the existence for growth-accelerating impact of industrial policies is 
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modest. While it is relatively easy to document the impact industrial policy 
interventions in all three countries had on the composition of output and trade 
(i.e. resources were indeed being shifted), attempts to formally model the impact 
of industrial policy interventions uniformly uncover little, if any, positive impact 
on productivity, growth, or welfare”. (Noland and Pack 2005: 8)      
 
Empirical Specification 
 
This section uses the models of optimal firm size presented above to examine 
empirically the major forces behind the growth process of Moroccan firms, 
including government policies. The variables used in this analysis are summarized 
in Table 1 and described further below. The dependent variable, ∆S(t) from 
equation (3), can be measured in different ways: as the average annual growth rate 
of a firm’s sales (this variable is here called SALESG), or as the average annual 
growth rate of employment (EMPLOYG). On the whole, I estimate two empirical 
models using each of the above specifications of the dependent variable. The 
following explanatory variables are drawn from the theoretical and empirical 
literature described above. 
 
Firm size. Firm size in the previous period, corresponding to the variable Si(t - 1) 
in equation (3), is designated here as FSIZE and measured as the logarithm of firm 
sales, defined as the average of firm sales in the years 2000-2002. Theoretically 
this variable could have a positive or a negative impact on firm growth, depending 
on the characteristics of the firm and the market in which it operates. It depends 
on the speed—that is, on parameter β in equation (3)—with which Moroccan 
firms converge toward their long-run steady-state size. 
 
The set of observable exogenous variables, X(t) in equation (3), are the following: 
 
Firm age. The age of a firm (AGE) is defined as the absolute number of years of 
existence since start-up. Theoretically and empiricallt it is assumed that younger 
firms grow faster. 
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Firm location. On the basis of responses to the questionnaire, firms were grouped 
into six geographical categories: 1. Grand Casablanca (accounting for 60.50 
percent of all firms interviewed); 2. Tanger-Tetouan (8.8 percent); 3. Rabat-Sale-
Zemmour (5.8 percent); 4. Fes-Boulmane (12.2 Percent); 5. Oriental (3); 6. 
Chaouia-Ouardigha (5.2 percent);   This information was used to construct five  
dummy variables: FLOCATION1 takes the value of 1 for firms in the second  
geographical category and 0 otherwise; FLOCATION2 takes the value of 1 for 
firms in the third category and 0 otherwise; FLOCATION3 takes the value of 1 
for firms in the fourth category and 0 otherwise; FLOCATION4 takes the value of 
1 for firms in the fifth category and 0 otherwise, and FLOCATION5 takes the 
value of 1 for firms in the sixth category and 0 otherwise. This leaves firms in 
Grand Casablanca, the largest firm location of Morocco, as the benchmark or 
omitted variable.  From the earlier theoretical discussion, firms in large urban 
centers should grow faster than firms in smaller location. 
 
Legal form. The questionnaire distinguishes among seven different legal forms: 
single proprietorships, partnerships, cooperatives, privately held corporations, 
limited liability corporations and public limited companies. Firms with the legal 
form “limited liability” accounts for a large majority (80 percent) of all firms 
interviewed. From this information a dummy variable FSTATUS1 was 
constructed that takes the value of 1 if the legal form is that of a limited liability 
company and 0 otherwise.  
 
Innovative ability. Another major source of firm growth is the ability to innovate. 
The two dummy variables PROINNOV and PROCESIN control for this important 
capability. The first dummy takes the value of 1 if the firm reports engaging in 
product innovation and 0 if it does not; the second one also takes the value of 1 if 
the firm reports engaging in process innovation and 0 if it does not.  
 
Product and market diversification. A further source of a firm’s growth is the 
ability to diversify both its existing products and services and its markets. The 
qualitative variables DIVERS1 and DIVERS2 address this ability. The first 
variable indicates that the firm diversifies its existing products and services and is 
therefore offering not only one single good or service (single-product firm) but a 
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variety of different goods and services (multi-product-firm). The second takes the 
value of 1 if the firm is able to diversify its product market and is exporting to 
foreign markets and 0 otherwise.  
 
Access to inputs. The ability of firms to obtain access to major inputs is also of 
paramount importance for their growth. Such assets would include managerial 
inputs, reflecting Penrose’s  “managerial limits to growth” hypothesis. The 
following five variables were constructed to deal with these issues: LWORK 
measures a firm's access to qualified workers, LFINANCE its access to external 
financial resources, LINFRAST its access to good infrastructure (for instance, 
telecommunications), LINFRAS2 its access to electricity and LLAND its access 
to industrial land. Each of these variables is measured on a 0-to-4 (Likert) scale, 
where 0 indicates that access to the input is not a major obstacle to growth, and 4 
that it is a major obstacle. 
 
Market structure. A major outcome of an industry’s market structure is whether 
firms can compete in product markets or not. A concrete expression of this market 
competition is the existence of a large number of firms competing in the same 
market. The variable DCOMPETE indicates the absolute number of domestic and 
foreign competitors. In addition, the variable MCOMPETE is measured on a scale 
from 0 to 4, where 0 means that the firm is not facing a severe competition and 4 
that it is facing a severe competition, especially from the informal sector. Finally 
the variable PCOMPETE measures price elasticity of demand in the relevant 
market. This is an indicator of the nature of competition in product market. 
Theoretically, competitive markets are characterized by a perfectly elastic 
demand.  
 
Market demand. Expected Demand in a firm’s product market enters the equation 
through the variable MDEMAND, measured as a dummy variable that takes the 
score of 1 if the firm reports that it has positive expectations of either domestic or 
foreign demand, otherwise 0. Theoretically, it is expected that greater expected 
market demand will enhance firm growth.  
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State regulations and policies. In the survey, firms were asked whether each of the 
following types of regulations and government policies (or consequences of poor 
policies) were not a major obstacle for growth (value of 0) or in contrary a major 
obstacle (value of 4):  
 
¾ Regulation of foreign trade: level of customs duties and management of the 
customs services 
¾ Tax regulation (relationship with tax administration) 
¾ Level of taxes  
¾ Regulation of the labor force 
¾ Interest rate policy 
¾ Inflation and volatility of exchange rates 
¾ Effectiveness of government policies in providing public goods (infrastructure, 
transportation, security, etc.) 
¾ Corruption 
  
Table 2 summarizes the average responses to each of these eight questions. On the 
whole, state regulations and policies are considered obstacles to doing business in 
Morocco. Their signs cannot be, however not predicted ex ante, since their impact 
on corporate growth depends on the specific situation of the firm and the industry 
it belongs to. 
 
Inter-industry differences. Theoretical and empirical studies suggest substantial 
inter-industry differences with respect to firm growth (see the discussion above). 
To control for these differences, industry dummies have been included in the 
regression analysis. According to the survey data, the garment industry was the 
most frequently cited branch of activity (42 percent). This industry is therefore 
used here as a benchmark. For the remaining industries—textile, leather and 
footwear, rubber and plastics, food processing, chemical industry, electrical 
industry --dummy variables were constructed, taking the value of 1 when the 
firm’s principal activity is in that industry, and 0 otherwise.     
 
Data 
  
Ideally, the empirical model of firm growth should be tested on the basis of panel 
data, to more fully reveal the growth dynamics of Moroccan firms. Unfortunately, 
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panel data for all the variables described above do not yet exist. What is available 
is a cross-sectional data set, based on a field survey of 850 firms, carried out under 
the auspices of the World Bank in 2004. The survey sample covers firms of 
different sizes: large (more than 100 workers), medium-size (50 to 100 workers), 
and small-size (10 workers or more).6 It also covers all of the major 
manufacturing industries in Morocco. 
 
The sample of firms under consideration is, for various reasons, not statistically 
representative of the universe of Moroccan firms. One reason is that the universe 
of firms is itself not really known but varies, according to the source, between 
270,888 (from the 1995 patent registry) and 900,687 firms (from the official 
statistical yearbook for 1996). In addition, the sampling method and the number of 
units drawn are not statistically adequate. Despite these shortfalls, the sample 
allows an explorative analysis of firm behavior in Morocco5.      
 
Econometric Problems 
 
A significant problem relates to the noise in the data. This is mostly due to the fact 
that almost all of the variables have the measurement properties of categorical 
data. To be useful in the econometric analysis, these responses have to be 
converted into dummy variables.  
 
A second problem is that there are missing values for firms in the data set that 
cannot be included in our estimate of equation (3). Since the remaining 
observations with no missing values were not selected randomly, this gives rise to 
sample selection bias in the data. In the presence of this specification error, the 
ordinary least squares procedure cannot be used to estimate equation (3). An 
alternative procedure is the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) method 
developed by Heckman (1976).7 This method corrects for the specification error 
due to sample selection bias.  
 
A third, more severe problem is that of so-called endogeneity: the endogeneity 
problem is due to fact that the relationship between firm growth and some of its 
                                                           
5 An excellent descriptive study of the Moroccan business climate based on those data is to find in World Bank 
(2005) 
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major determinants is not one-way. Firms’ decisions on growth (dependent 
variable) and firm strategy, innovation etc. (independent variable) influence each 
other and have often been taken simultaneously. An econometric solution to this 
problem is to develop instrumental variables. Unfortunately, such instruments are 
not easy to find (lack of data). 
 
 
3.3. Results   
 
As already mentioned above, two regression equations, using different specifications of the 
dependent variable (SALESG and EMPLOYG), were estimated. Due to the better 
econometric quality of the EMPLOYG equation, I will present and discuss the results of this 
equation only (see Table 5): 
 
 
• Firm size (FSIZE) seems to have a positive impact on firm growth: the 
larger a firm was in 2000-02, the higher the probability of it being 
expected to grow in the years since its establishment. An acceleration of 
the convergence process toward a long-term steady-state size takes place. 
In other words, larger firms grow faster than smaller ones. This result, 
which in is in this case, statistically significant, is not consistent with some 
previous empirical findings in developing countries, as discussed above8. 
 
• Firm age (AGE) has, in contrast, a negative impact on firm growth. 
Younger firms grow faster. Other researchers have shown that they are 
also the ones that are more likely to export than older firms (Fafchamps,  
El Hamine, and Zeufack, 2002).9 This result, which is statistically 
significant, confirms our expectations stated above. 
 
• Firm location (variables FLOCATION1--FLOCATION5) also matters. 
Compared with firms located in the large urban centers (especially Grand 
Casablanca, which is used here as benchmark), those in medium-size 
urban centers and especially those in smaller centers (for instance, 
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Chaouia-Ourdigha) expect less growth. The regional dimension of firm 
growth is also important in Morocco, as one would expect. 
 
• The legal form of the enterprise normally affects the growth process of 
firms (see above). In the Moroccan case, this hypothesis seems not to be 
confirmed: the impact of the variable FSTATUS on firm growth is very 
weak and statistically not significant.  
 
• There is some evidence indicating that the ability of a firm to innovate (as 
measured by the variables PROINNOV and PROCESIN) is not positively 
correlated with employment growth, but the two variables, especially the 
one related to process innovation, are not statistically significant. 
 
• A further source of growth is a firm’s ability to diversify its existing 
products and services: the variable DIVERS1 is negatively correlated with 
firm’ growth, although not statistically significant. Being a multi-product 
firm is not necessarily a recipe of growth in Morocco. On the other hand, 
and this is very important, firms that try to diversify their product markets 
and export are more successful: the sign on DIVERS2 is positive, 
numerically strong and statistically significant.  
 
• Access or not access to at least some major inputs also has an impact on 
firm growth. Lack of access to qualified labor force (LWORK) and to 
industrial land (LLAND) seems to be detrimental to the growth process of 
Moroccan firms (their coefficients are statistically significant). Less severe 
impediments are lack of access to telecommunications (LINFRAST), to 
external financial resources (LFINANCE) and to basic infrastructure, such 
as electricity (LINFRAS2). The latter inputs don’t seem to matter –on 
average- for firm growth. 
 
• The market structure and the competitive environment under which firms 
are operating affect their behavior regarding the quantity of products to be 
produced and pricing policy.  In our case, this market structure measured 
by the number of competitors in a specific market (DCOMPETE) and by 
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the qualitative perception of competitive pressure by firms interviewed 
(MCOMPETE), has a negative impact on firm’s employment growth (the 
coefficients are negative, though not statistically significant.) 
 
• Market demand seems to exert an strong impact on firm growth: the 
MDEMAND variable shows a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient.  
• Firms operating in the industries, such as leather & footwear, rubber & 
plastics have experienced a less favorable growth environment than those 
in the garment (benchmark) On the other hand, firms belonging to food 
processing, chemical industries, electrical machinery and, especially to 
textile industries seem to have a more growth-enhancing environment. 
Industry-specific factors, as measured here by industry dummies, do 
matter for the growth process of firms operating in those industries. 
• State regulations and policies appear to have mixed effects. Effective 
government policies aiming at improving the quantity and quality of 
public goods, such a infrastructure, public transportation, security, 
education and health, and the interest rate policy (part of the overall 
monetary policy set up by the Central bank) seem to affect firm growth 
positively (the signs of the variables GOVERNM1 and GOVERNM6 are 
positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level). All other 
government policies included in our econometric analysis seem, however, 
to have a negative impact on firm growth: tax policy, customs policy 
exchange rate policy, and especially corruption (the latter is often seen as 
going hand in hand with industrial policies) seem to be detrimental to 
employment growth of Moroccan firms (the signs of the variables 
GOVERNM2 and GOVERNM7 are negative and statistically significant).  
 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this paper was first to describe the major instruments of industrial policy in 
Morocco since its independence (1956) and secondly to assess them empirically. Regarding 
the second objective the research question has been whether government policies have 
contributed to economic growth of private firms. This question has been raised and tested in a 
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broader model of firm growth. Using firm-level data for 2004, the principal factors positively 
affecting firm growth in Morocco were found to be the following:  (1) firm size: larger firms 
grow faster than smaller firms; (2) business strategies that focus on market diversification, 
especially export markets; (3) location (in large urban centers); (4) strong and predictable 
demand for the firm’s products, and (5) government policies that are aimed at improving the 
quantity and quality of public goods, such as infrastructure, public transportation, security and 
adequate interest rate (credit) policy etc.  
 
The principal factors that affect firm growth negatively are the following: (1) firm age: 
younger firms grow faster; (2) ability to innovate: technological innovation has not been jet a 
source of growth in the Moroccan context. Therefore only a few firms do it (less than 5 
percent); (3) lack of access to qualified worker; (4) lack to industrial land (5) market structure 
and competition; (6) location in small population centers, and (7) most government policies 
that have been included in the econometric analysis, such as taxes policy toward firms, 
customs policy, exchange rate policy and last but not least (8) state corruption, very often 
associated with selective government policies toward the economy. 
 
If confirmed by further analysis, these results have important policy implications for both 
business leaders and policymakers in Morocco. For business leaders, is it important to 
emphasize that an explicit and sound growth strategy matters. Important points of such a 
strategy include the choice of the right location and legal form, and the choice of markets with 
sufficiently strong and expanding demand. A promising way for firms to grow in Morocco is 
to diversify both the products offered and their markets (export). For policymakers, the 
analysis suggests several policy areas where improvements may be needed. Above all, a 
major lesson of this case study is that they are indirect clues of the inefficacy of industrial 
policies in Morocco, at least measured by their impact on firm growth.  
 
Other clues of the inefficacy of industrial policies in Morocco come from other studies as 
well. In their ongoing empirical work on the “determinants of productivity in Morocco- the 
role of trade”, Michael Gasiorek and his colleagues conclude “there is some evidence that 
protected domestic industries tend to be less productive.” This statement is derived from the 
econometric result that “a 1% point increase in tariff protection results in a decrease in 
productivity by 0.3%.” (Gasiorek et al. 2005: 22). 
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In its latest Economic Memorandum on Morocco, the World Bank suggests that the structure 
of the Moroccan economy, especially of its exports, has not changed over the last 25 years. 
The sectoral composition of GDP has not changed: agriculture continues to account for about 
16 percent of GDP; the share of the industrial sector essentially has not expanded over time, 
while oscillating between 16 and 19 percent of GDP and concentrating in three manufacturing 
exports: chemical, agri-food and textile and leather products; and services continue to prevail, 
with moderate recent dynamism in sub-sectors like tourism, government transportation and 
financial intermediation services. In addition, after having computed several indicators 
measuring the degree of the so-called productive diversification of the Moroccan domestic 
economy and exports, the experts of the World Bank conclude: “The Moroccan economy 
suffers from a too slow process of structural transformation for achieving higher growth, 
especially on its exports…” (World Bank, 2006).  
 
The lack of a sufficient productive diversification of the Moroccan economy, illustrated in the 
World Bank report, is an additional indirect clue of the inefficacy of industrial policies 
pursued in Morocco since its independence.  
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Table 1: Variable Description  
Variable Description 
Dependent variable  
SALESG Logarithm of the average annual rate of growth of sales 
from 2002 to the year of firm establishment, in percent 
 
EMPLOYG Logarithm of the average annual rate of growth of from 
2002 to the year of firm establishment, in percent 
 
  
  
Independent variables: 
Firm-specific 
 
FSIZE Logarithm of firm sales as an average of firm sales in 
2000, 2001 and 2002. 
FLOCATION1 
 
 
FLOCATION2 
 
 
FLOCATION3 
 
 
FLOCATION4 
 
 
FLOCATION5 
 
Dummy variable with value of 1 if firm is headquartered 
in Tanger-Tetouan, otherwise 0 
 
Dummy variable with value of 1 if firm is headquartered 
in Rabat- Sale-Zemmour, otherwise 0 
 
Dummy variable with value of 1 if firm is headquartered 
in Fes-Boulmane, otherwise 0 
 
Dummy variable with value of 1 if firm is headquartered 
in Oriental, otherwise 0 
 
Dummy variable with value of 1 if firm is headquartered 
in Chaouia-Ouardigha, otherwise 0 
 
AGE Number of years of firm’s existence, between 2004 and 
the year of its establishment. 
 
FSTATUS1 Dummy variable with value of 1 if firm is established as 
a limited-liability corporation, otherwise 0 
 
 
PROINNOV 
 
 
 
PROCESIN 
 
Dummy variable with value of 1 if firm reports that it 
engages in product innovation, otherwise 0,  
 
Dummy variable with value of 1 if firm reports that it 
engages in process innovation, otherwise 0,  
 
DIVERSE1 Number of the different products a firm is producing, in 
absolute terms. 
 
DIVERSE2 Dummy variable with value of 1 if firm reports that it 
exporting, otherwise 0,  
  
Independent variables:  
Access to inputs 
 
LWORK Access of the firm to qualified labor force, measured on 
a 0-4 scale. 
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A score of 0 indicates that access is not a major obstacle 
and 4 that it is major obstacle,  
  
LFINANCE Access of the firm to outside bank financing, measured 
on a 0-4 scale. 
A score of 0 indicates that access is not a major obstacle 
and 4 that it is major obstacle,  
LINFRAST Access of the firm to telecommunication infrastructure, 
measured on a 0-4 scale. 
A score of 0 indicates that access is not a major obstacle 
and 4 that it is major obstacle. 
LLAND Access of the firm to industrial land, measured on a 0-4 
scale. 
A score of 0 indicates that access is not a major obstacle 
and 4 that it is major obstacle,  
LINFRAS2 Access of the firm to electricity, measured on a 0-4 
scale. 
A score of 0 indicates that access is not a major obstacle 
and 4 that it is major obstacle. 
Independent variables:  
Market structure 
 
DCOMPETE Number of competitors in the market, in which a firm is 
operating, in absolute terms.  
PCOMPETE Price elasticity of domestic demand in which a firm is 
operating, measured on a 1-4 scale. 
A score of 1 indicates that the elasticity is almost 0 and 
4 that it is important 
 
MCOMPETE Dummy variable that indicates the severity of 
competition from the informal sector, measured on a 0-4 
scale. 
A score of 0 indicates that this kind of competition is not 
a major obstacle and 4 that it is major obstacle. 
MDEMAND Dummy variable indicating that anticipating of domestic 
demand or of foreign demand is a major factor for 
investment. It takes the value of 1 if this factor is the 
most important decision factor for investment, 2 if this 
factor is the second most important decision factor for 
investment, and 3 if this factor is the 3rd most important 
decision factor for investment. 
Independent variables: 
Industry Dummies 
 
TEXTILE Dummy variable with value of 1 if firm reports that its 
primary activity is textile,  
LEATHER Dummy variable with value of 1 if firm reports that its 
primary activity is leather and footwear,  
RUBBER Dummy variable with value of 1 if firm reports that its 
primary activity is rubber and plastics,  
FOOD Dummy variable with value of 1 if firm reports that its 
primary activity is food processing,  
CHEMICAL Dummy variable with value of 1 if firm reports that its 
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primary activity is chemical industries,  
ELECTRIC Dummy variable with value of 1 if firm reports that its 
primary activity electrical machinery,  
Independent variables: 
Policy Variables 
 
GOVERNM1 Effectiveness of government policies regarding the 
provision of public goods (such as infrastructure, public 
transportation, security, education and health etc). 
A score of 1 indicates that the policy is very effective 
and  6 that is  very ineffective 
GOVERNM2 Importance of Customs policy for firm growth, 
measured on a 0-4 scale. 
A score of 0 indicates that the policy is not a major 
obstacle and 4 that it is major obstacle. 
GOVERNM3 Importance of the relationship between firm 
management and customs authorities for firm growth, 
measured on a 0-4 scale. 
A score of 0 indicates that the policy is not a major 
obstacle and 4 that it is major obstacle. 
GOVERNM4 Importance of tax rate policy for firm growth, measured 
on a 0-4 scale. 
A score of 0 indicates that the policy is not a major 
obstacle and 4 that it is major obstacle. 
GOVERNM5 Importance of labor code policy to firm growth, 
measured on a 0-4 scale. 
A score of 0 indicates that the policy is not a major 
obstacle and 4 that it is major obstacle. 
GOVERNM6 Importance of interest rate policy for firm growth, 
measured on a 0-4 scale. 
A score of 0 indicates that the policy is not a major 
obstacle and 4 that it is major obstacle. 
GOVERNM7 Importance inflation and exchange rate policy for firm 
growth, measured on a 0-4 scale. 
A score of 0 indicates that the policy is not a major 
obstacle and 4 that it is major obstacle. 
GOVERNM8 Importance of corruption for firm growth, measured on a 
0-4 scale. 
A score of 0 indicates that corruption is not a major 
obstacle and 4 that it is major obstacle. 
 
Source: Author’s model specifications 
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Table 2: Reported Impact of State Policies on Firms in the Sample 
 
 
 
Type of Regulation or Policy 
Average 
Response  
(4 = Severe 
Obstacle,  
0 = No 
Obstacle) 
 
Customs   1.0 
 
Relationships with tax administration   1.8 
 
Level of taxes   2.6 
 
Regulations of  labor force   1.1 
 
Corruption   1.0 
 
Interest rate policy  (costs of capital) 3.1 
 
Inflation and volatility of exchange rates                                             
 
1.4 
 
  
\MoroccoPicking winneres & losers.doc 3/16/2007 38 
 38
 Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable        N            Mean         Std Dev         Minimum         Maximum            
ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
sales         799       113103342      1561022324        64509.67     40300862738 
Lsales        799      16.1677876       1.6079559      11.0745704      24.4196387 
AGE           850      18.2176471      13.8153196       2.0000000      80.0000000 
worker        356     139.8792135     221.9635311       4.6666667         2348.00 
Lworker       356       4.2379088       1.1663950       1.5404450       7.7613192 
SALESG        799       1.3426366       0.9723374       0.2256233       6.9207902 
EMPLOYG       356       0.3529254       0.3132527       0.0443645       1.8099433 
FSIZE         799      16.1677876       1.6079559      11.0745704      24.4196387 
FSIZE2        356       4.2379088       1.1663950       1.5404450       7.7613192 
FLOCATION     850       0.6470588       0.4781660               0       1.0000000 
FLOCATION1    850       0.0494118       0.2168538               0       1.0000000 
FLOCATION2    850       0.0247059       0.1553186               0       1.0000000 
FLOCATION3    850       0.0505882       0.2192844               0       1.0000000 
FLOCATION4    850       0.1070588       0.3093701               0       1.0000000 
FLOCATION5    850       0.1211765       0.3265244               0       1.0000000 
LAGE          850       2.6171099       0.7911986       0.6931472       4.3820266 
FSTATUS       850       0.7658824       0.4236954               0       1.0000000 
PROINNOV      850       0.4482353       0.4976060               0       1.0000000 
PROCESIN      850       0.3447059       0.4755521               0       1.0000000 
DIVERSE1      848       4.0931604      19.1892224       1.0000000     500.0000000 
DIVERSE2      850       0.6423529       0.4795897               0       1.0000000 
LWORK         850       1.3694118       1.2960049               0       4.0000000 
LFINANCE      850       3.0694118       1.2991366               0       4.0000000 
LINFRAST      850       0.3494118       0.6993390               0       4.0000000 
LINFRAS2      850       0.7082353       1.0807461               0       4.0000000 
LLAND         850       1.9694118       1.4402937               0       4.0000000 
TEXTILE       850       0.1882353       0.3911301               0       1.0000000 
LEATHER       850       0.0941176       0.2921642               0       1.0000000 
RUBBER        850       0.0905882       0.2871916               0       1.0000000 
FOOD          850       0.0847059       0.2786075               0       1.0000000 
CHEMICAL      850       0.0705882       0.2562866               0       1.0000000 
ELECTRICA     850       0.0341176       0.1816382               0       1.0000000 
OTHERIND      850       0.0447059       0.2067790               0       1.0000000 
DCOMPETE      345     101.6608696     164.7236880               0         1050.00 
MCOMPETE      850       1.7388235       1.6387601               0       4.0000000 
PCOMPETE      484       2.8636364       0.7761987       1.0000000       4.0000000 
STATE1        850    -4.72579E-17       1.0000000      -1.5678681       2.8154014 
STATE2        850    1.334227E-16       1.0000000      -2.6537021       2.0600076 
STATE3        850    -3.26536E-17       1.0000000      -3.0645812       1.1352030 
GOVERNM1      849       3.6548881       1.0672451       1.0000000       6.0000000 
GOVERNM2      850       1.0800000       1.2019615               0       4.0000000 
GOVERNM3      850       1.7894118       1.3630254               0       4.0000000 
GOVERNM4      850       2.6000000       1.2581887               0       4.0000000 
GOVERNM5      850       1.1776471       1.2007925               0       4.0000000 
GOVERNM6      850       3.1411765       1.1913799               0       4.0000000 
GOVERNM7      850       1.4011765       1.3398833               0       4.0000000 
GOVERNM8      850       0.9764706       1.3316521               0       4.0000000 
MDEMAND       850       0.4282353       0.4951144               0       1.0000000 
                      
ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
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 Table 4: MODEL Procedure 
 
 
                          Nonlinear FIML Summary of Residual Errors 
 
                  DF       DF                                                                
                                                                                      Adj 
Equation        Model    Error         SSE         MSE    Root MSE    R-Square       R-Sq 
EMPLOYG            37       67      0.9222      0.0138      0.1173      0.7399     0.6001 
 
 
 
 
 
The Equation to Estimate is 
 
EMPLOYG =  F(a1(1), a2(AGE), a3(FSIZE), a4(FLOCATION1), a5(FSTATUS), 
a6(PROINNOV), a7(PROCESIN), a8(DIVERSE1), a9(DIVERSE2), a10(LWORK), 
a11(LFINANCE), a12(LINFRAST), a13(LINFRAS2), a14(LLAND), a15(TEXTILE), 
a16(LEATHER), a17(RUBBER), a18(FOOD), 19(CHEMICAL), a20(ELECTRICA), 
a21(DCOMPETE), a22(MCOMPETE), a23(PCOMPETE), 
a24(GOVERNM1), a25(GOVERNM2), a26(GOVERNM3), a27(GOVERNM4), a28(GOVERNM5), 
a29(GOVERNM6), a30(GOVERNM7), a31(GOVERNM8), a32(OTHERIND), 
a33(FLOCATION2), a34(FLOCATION3), a35(FLOCATION4), a36(FLOCATION5), 
a37(MDEMAND)) 
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Table 5: Nonlinear FIML Parameter Estimates 
 
 
 
                                                     Approx                                        
                             Approx 
Parameter       Estimate     Std Err    t Value     Pr > |t| 
 
a1              -0.42703      0.1810      -2.36       0.0212 
a2              -0.00981    0.000854     -11.49       <.0001 
a3              0.046298      0.0109       4.25       <.0001 
a4              -0.05408      0.0667      -0.81       0.4201 
a5              0.002945      0.0271       0.11       0.9139 
a6              -0.05244      0.0288      -1.82       0.0728 
a7              0.024929      0.0332       0.75       0.4558 
a8              -0.00422     0.00260      -1.62       0.1090 
a9              0.090114      0.0262       3.44       0.0010 
a10             0.021233      0.0125       1.70       0.0934 
a11             -0.00114      0.0158      -0.07       0.9427 
a12             -0.02481      0.0172      -1.44       0.1549 
a13              -0.0028      0.0132      -0.21       0.8324 
a14             0.018988     0.00832       2.28       0.0256 
a15              0.06564      0.0373       1.76       0.0834 
a16             -0.00357      0.0419      -0.09       0.9325 
a17             -0.04215      0.0422      -1.00       0.3218 
a18             0.066275      0.0535       1.24       0.2200 
a19             0.053808      0.0511       1.05       0.2961 
a20             0.240862      0.1403       1.72       0.0906 
a21             -0.00014    0.000146      -0.95       0.3463 
a22              -0.0089     0.00783      -1.14       0.2598 
a23              -0.0042      0.0153      -0.27       0.7851 
a24             0.034537      0.0125       2.76       0.0074 
a25             -0.02176      0.0148      -1.47       0.1466 
a26             0.012924      0.0137       0.94       0.3492 
a27             -0.02637      0.0110      -2.40       0.0190 
a28              0.00806      0.0121       0.67       0.5077 
a29             0.035726      0.0174       2.05       0.0438 
a30             -0.02944      0.0132      -2.23       0.0289 
a31             -0.00495      0.0119      -0.42       0.6785 
a32             0.008485      0.0542       0.16       0.8760 
a33             -0.23234      0.1252      -1.86       0.0680                                
a34             -0.02306      0.0956      -0.24       0.8101                                
a35             -0.02835      0.0367      -0.77       0.4421 
a36             -0.19469      0.0880      -2.21       0.0303 
a37             0.049858      0.0234       2.13       0.0370 
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  I would like to thank Mr. Najy Benhassine of the World Bank for authorizing me to use the 2004 World Bank 
data set of firms. 
1 On the United States see Evans (1987a, 1987b) and Hall (1987); on the United Kingdom see Hart and Oulton 
(1995, 1996, 1998), Dunne and Hughes (1996) and Geroski (1998); on Germany see Wagner (1994), Brüderl 
and others (1998), Brixy and Kohaut (1999), Steil and Wolf (1999) and Almus (2000); on Switzerland see 
Harabi  (2002).    
2 There are, of course, other theoretical perspectives on firm growth. The most important are evolutionary 
models of firm growth (see Neslon and Winter, 1982) and stochastic growth models; for a survey of these 
models, see Sutton (1997). 
 
3 The word “satisficing” was invented by Herbert Simon (1959) as a hybrid of the words “satisfy” and “suffice.” 
4 For work on the effects of age, see Evans (1987), Dunne and Hughes (1994), and Das (1995); on that of R&D 
expenditures see Hall (1987) and Liu, Tsou, and Hammit (1999); on that of mergers and acquisitions see Ijiri and 
Simon (1974); on that of the internal organization of firms see Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989) and 
Variyan and Kraybill (1992). For recent overviews of the literature see Sutton (1997) and Hart (2000). 
5 Authors who have studied the relationship between location and firm growth include North and Smallbone 
(1994), Storey (1994), and Henderson (1994). 
6 The size distribution in the World Bank sample is as follows: 40% small firms, 38% medium size and 22% 
large firms .   
7 See also the exposition in Greene (2000, pp. 693-96) 
8 The result that firm size is negatively correlated with growth in Morocco has also been found in many other 
developing countries. It has been established both through cross-country analysis (Leidholm and Mead 1987; 
Banarji 1987), and through analysis across time within countries (Little, Mazumdar, and Page 1987; Steel 1993)    
9 The same source finds that old firms are unlikely to switch to exporting, even in response to changes in 
macroeconomic incentives to export. 
 
 
 
 
 
